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Self 
Government 
A series of radio talks deliv-
ered by the History Depart-
ment of Trinity College} under 
the sponsorship of the Connect-
icut Daughters of the Ameri-




Trinity College, as a liberal educational 
institution, has an obligation to the com-
munity and the free government of which 
it is a part. I am glad that the Department 
of History and Political Science has had an 
opportunity, in this series of radio broad-
casts, to share its knowledge and experience 
with the large audience afforded by Station 
WTHT. The series was a anged by the 
Connecticut Society of the Daughters of the 
American Revolution. The cooperation of 
that group with the College is a noteworthy 
example of the role which Trinity has played 
and will continue to play with increasing 
vigor in the life of the Connecticut com-
munity. In the brief radio addresses, the texts 
of which are here reprinted, the College and 
its f acuity members reveal that they are w~ll 
equipped to participate in the process of 
popular education which is so essential if we 
are to have an informed body of political 
opinion and the sound, healthy society which 
results therefrom. 
G. Keith Funston, 
President. 
FOREWORD 
Through our Radio Committee under 
the chairmanship of Mrs. Ralph Gerth, and 
through the cooper;ation of Dr. Edward 
Humphrey and the professors of History 
and Government of Trinity College, the 
Connecticut Da'ughters of the American 
Revolution were able to sponsor a series of 
radio programs over WT HT, the Hartford 
Times Broadcasting Station. These broad-
casts were an educational series on self-gov-
ernment. Connecticut is rightly called the 
Constitution State. 
As State Regent of the Connecticut 
Daughters of the American Revolution, I 
wish to express both my personal apprecia-
. tion and that of my members for the gener-
osity of Dr. Humphrey and the professors 
of Trinity College who participated in these 
broadcasts and who gave such unselfish con-
tribution of time and knowledge in order that 
there might be a better understanding of the 
principles of democracy impressed upon the 
world. 
Marjorie B. Iffland, 
State Regent. 

Self-Government in the American Colonies 
by 
BRINTON THOMPSON 
My topic is self-government during the Colonial period of 
American history. Self-government on a democratic basis, desired 
and struggled for so much by mankind, has been rarely attained 
in world history. In most of the world and among most of the 
people there has never been any democratic self-government above 
the tribal level. It is a difficult technique not easily taught or 
learned. 
In the Classical world of Greece and Rome there were govern-
ments formed on a rather broad popular base but they lapsed and 
their like was not to appear for centuries. It is well to realize that 
self-government is not self-perpetuating and is a high art seldom 
mastered and easily lost. It is of course fundamental to our civili-
zation and goes back to our beginnings. 
The first colonists had definite ideas of fundamental personal 
rights which included considerable self-government, and which 
were traditionally British. It is a characteristic of peoples of the 
British tradition to base their demands for reform on actual or 
supposed earlier rights that have lapsed. The English speaking 
peoples who have been so outstanding in the art of government 
have not been inclined to follow theoretical models in their develop-
ment but rather to improve and safeguard what they have. 
The successful founding of the United States after the Revo-
lution was epoch making, for while successful political revolutions 
are extremely common in history, the e~tablishment of a successful 
and stable government afterwards, without years of chaos and 
disintegration intervening, is extremely rare. It should be remem-
bered that in the case of the United States there had been pre-
viously one hundred and fifty years of self-government in the 
colonies. 
When the first English colonists arrived, they believed they 
were bringing with them all the rights they were entitled to under 
Dr. D. G. Brinton Thompson joined the History Department as Assistant 
Professor in October 1945. He graduated from the University of Penn-
sylvania A.B., 1920 and from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
B.S. in 1923. He was associated in business from 1924 to 1941, and then 
entered the Graduate School of Columbia University and received his Ph.D. 
in 1945. Dr. Thompson's specialty is the history of the United States, par-
ticularly the Middle Atlantic States. He published last fall the biography 
of Samuel B. Ruggles, Ruggles of New York. 
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Magna ~arta. Whether the barons who had extorted these rights 
from Kmg John meant them to apply to all, is immaterial because 
by the time of the coloniz~tion of America it was believed that 
Magna Carta applied to all Englishmen .. 
The founding of the colonies was attended by the granting of 
specific royal charters binding each colony. It became the custom 
for the colonists to examine these charters in case of dispute and 
to base their arguments on their own interpretation of the text. 
Thus we have the genesis of the custom of a written constitution 
which we adopted for the States and for the Union. The practice 
of having a written constitution, so commonplace to us, was then 
a novel practice in the world. Since then, mankind has been turning 
out in quantity written constitutions which have been largely 
futile. 
While there is no doubt that the idea of self-government was 
a British heritage, yet there is also no doubt that this idea and the 
necessary political machinery to achieve it was far more developed 
in the colonies than in the mother country. 
I 
When in 1607 the first permanent settlement was made in 
Virginia, the whole effort was at first too precarious to allow for 
much thought on local government, but it was not long before the 
principle was established. In 1619 a representative legislative 
group, the Virginia House of Burgesses, was called together. The 
event is not only significant in the establishment of colonial self-
government but also for the fact that the House of Burgesses is 
the second oldest representative legislative body with a continuous 
record in the world. Only the British Parliament is older. What- · 
ever one may say about the youth of this country, a subject in 
itself somewhat worn out with age, we are among the oldest in 
our experience with representative government. Washington, Jef-
f er son, Madison, Marshall, and the other great men of Virginia 
who did so much to found our nation had not only had in most 
cases personal experience in the colonial government, but lived in 
a community that had had representative government for over a 
century. 
When in the depth of the New England winter of 1620 the 
little Mayflower was poking desperately along the coast of Massa-
chusetts Bay seeking a suitable place to start a colony, the leading 
men of the expedition-knowing they weren't where they were 
.supposed to be and had dubious authority to be where they were--
made a compact providing for local government. Thus from the 
very start New England colonists had self-government and they 
were to stick to it stubbornly against all authori~y, legal or illegal. 
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However, particularly in the colony dominated by Boston, 
government was strictly restricted to the religiously elect. It was 
left to Thomas Hooker, who led his congregation, in 1636, across 
New England to found Hartford, to ennunciate principles that 
have become fundamental in our philosophy. In 1637 he wrote 
the following to a doubting governor of Massachusetts, "In mat-
ters . . . . which concern the common good, a general council, 
chosen by all, to transact business which concern all, I con-
ceive . . . ~ most suitable to rule and most safe for the relief of 
the whole." The next year he embodied these ideals in a great 
sermon before the members of the Connecticut General Court, , 
and under the influence of the sermon the Court drew up the 
Fundamental Orders for whkh Connecticut can be justly proud. 
In the Orders a broadly based representative government was 
organized. For the first time in America if not in the world since 
the Classical Republics, a written constitution created a govern-
ment. To be sure in certain other parts of New England the same 
principles of rule had been in vogue but they had not been em-
bodied in a written instrument of government. 
Forty years were to pass before any further noteworthy ad-
vance in government was to occur in America, although during 
that time the great ideal of religious liberty had been established 
by Roger Williams in Rhode Island. In 1677 a group of colonists 
going to West Jersey (New Jersey then being divided into two 
colonies) brought a charter called the "Concessions and Agree-
ments." This charter provided for a government giving greater 
rights and more broadly based than any other in America. It 
included an assembly freely chosen whose members were to be 
paid, had full liberty of speech, and entire control over legislation. 
The people were guaranteed in all their fundamental freedoms, 
and modern restrictions on the severity of criminal punishments 
were established. This document shows the hancl of William Penn, 
the greatest of the founders, who was then deeply interested in 
West Jersey. 
In 1681 Penn obtained his own colony, Pennsylvania, from 
Charles II. He desired this grant not for profit but for a "holy 
experiment" in the founding of a colony, and history records that 
in rapid growth of population and prosperity it exceeded all. He 
approached the problem of draughting a government with a due 
sense of its importance and with proper humility. He desired a 
government that would work and he said that the principle that 
would guide him would be that "liberty without obedience is con-
fusioq, and obedience without liberty is slavery/' It was his wish 
that the final or Great Charter of Pennsylvania should be drawn 
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by the Pennsylvania Assembly. This charter closely folrowed Penn's 
wishes. It carefully guarded the rights of individuals and showed 
a broad humanitarian spirit. Philadelphia, under the influence of 
Penn's ideals, was to be the leader in America in the treatment 
of the sick, insane, and criminal. 
By 1765 there was self-government in every one of the colonies. 
There were two charter colonies, Connecticut and Rhode Island, 
two proprietary colonies, Pennsylvania and Maryland, and all the 
rest were royal colonies. The governments although superficially 
different were very much alike. All spoke the same language, all 
followed the English Common Law, all had elected assemblies 
with broad powers, and a governor. On the surface the consider-
able theoretical powers of the governors, appointed either directly 
or indirectly by the crown except in the charter colonies, would 
appear to check self-government. But as a matter of fact, since 
the governors depended for their pay on the assemblies, they in-
evitably bowed to the popular body. The governors might storm 
and point to their legal authority, but sooner or later they saw 
the light and opened negotiations with the assemblies in order 
to get their salaries. 
Connecticut and Rhode Island, the charter colonies, elected 
their own governors, and did not even have the necessity of teach-
ing a new governor his place. Connecticut in 1662 and Rhode Island 
in 1663 obtained their charters from Charles II, and by tact 
maintained their charters in the face of the growing dislike of 
all colonial charters by the home government. These charters 
suited the people of the two colonies so well that they kept them 
when they became states in the Union; Connecticut until 1818 and 
Rhode Island until 1842. 
In conclusion it can be seen from this brief survey that all 
the colonies had extensive self-government by the time of the 
Revolution. The new states benefited greatly by this experience. 
The men that wrote the constitutions of the States and the con-
stitution of the Union had had in many cases actual personal train-
ing in the difficult art of government. A large number of people 
throughout the new nation had not only had the experience of 
governing but had been brought up under a system of self-govern-
ment as had their fathers before them. 
Probably the most important of the many causes of the Revo-
lution was the widespread feeling that the British Parliament 
intended seriously to limit this liberty. For a long time the colonies 
had enjoyed "salutary neglect" by the homeland. Now, however, 
Parliament was stating its legal right, which many modern authori-
ties agree it had, of ruling the colonies without their consent. 
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While the measures that Parliament passed to govern the colonies 
were in large part withdrawn and modified in the face of the bitter 
opposition of the Americans, yet what disturbed the colonists was 
that Parliament only bowed to the storm for expediency's sake 
and still stubbornly held to the right of issuing such legislation. 
Later on during the Revolution George III became the scapegoat 
but the real quarrel was with the British Parliament and its re-
fusal to recognize the right of self-government in America. · 
By any comparative standard our country has been successful 
in the art of democratic government, but it is well to recognize 
that this success has rested on a background of long years of self-





LAURENCE L. BARBER 
Self-government involves, by definition, the right of a nation 
to govern itself. The United States has possessed this right of 
independence for over one hundred and sixty years. It has not 
been seriously questioned for more than a century. Even modern 
warfare aims at the subjection, not the extermination, of a major 
power, as the continued existence of Japan and the planned re-
construction of Germany prove. For these reasons, we need waste 
little time considering fancied threats to our governmental exist-
ence, whether from internal subversion, external aggression, or 
voluntary participation in international organization. One is neither 
a blind optimist nor a super-patriot to assume that from the stand-
point of sheer independence America is and will remain self-
governing. Such is merely a necessity of the international order. 
As Professor Thompson has shown, self-government is gener-
ally based upon constitutional guarantees. The American Revolu-
tion was a struggle not only for independence but also for such 
guarantees. Constitutional security, in contrast to arbitrary rule, 
has become fundamental to American politics and administration. 
In fact, the gravest charge which can be levied against an official 
of our government is that he has violated the Constitution. At times 
we even seem to be setting up a documentary idol wi~hout under-
standing what it really means. 
Because of all this, our constitutional system, like our inde-
pendence, faces no serious dangers at present or in the visible 
future. Those who see anti-constitutional movements or menaces 
lurking in every corner or under every bed seriously insult the 
mass of the American people and their love for constitutional self-
government, and show a distrust of one of the essential premises 
of democracy : a belief in the innate honesty and intelligence of 
the common man. 
Dr. Laurence L. Barber, Jr., Assistant Professor in the Department, was 
graduated from Harvard in 1937, magna cum laude. In 1941 he received his 
Ph.D. from Harvard, and taught as an assistant in Government and Public 
Relations at Harvard, Radcliffe and Boston University. Dr. Barber served 
in many positions on government research committees before entering the 
Army as a Classification and Information Educational Specialist with the 12th 
Army Group. 
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Americans, having secured and established their independence 
and constitutionafo:m, are apt to assume that self-government is 
thus complete and automatically self-perpetuating. We often fail 
to realize that beyond independence, or the opportunity for self-
government, won at such great cost by our spiritual ancestors ; 
and beyond constitutionalism, or the framework of self-govern-
ment, established at such great pains in years past ; there is an 
essence or a challenge, which demands constant rethinking, calls 
for continued activity, and produces the major appeal of democracy 
in the world battleground of ideologies. 
The basis of this challenge is an emphasis on individualism, 
on the proper governing or controlling of our personal selves. 
Since we believe that man's political importance depends upon 
his person rather than upon his being merely a building block unit, 
it follows that our government is the result of the actions of 
numerous individuals. Thus self-government in America today, 
as at any other time or place, involves freedoms or liberties, par-
ticipation in the process of government, and toleration of others 
who wish to enjoy those freedoms or take part in that process, 
whether their economic beliefs, religious faith, or color of skin 
are the same as ours or not. All of these factors involve treating 
people as individuals. 
We in America talk a great deal about freedom. The Fascists 
used to say that we emphasized rights and neglected duties. Re-
gardless, self-government means to us a chance to provide our-
selves with liberties-of speech and press, of assembly and religion, 
of judicial process. To a great extent we have secured those liber-
ties. What the Revolutionists of 1776 dimly foresaw, we take for 
granted. 
All freedoms are relative. Rarely can we safely allow ourselves 
complete liberty in any sphere. But within certain broadly defined 
limits, we in America today have the right and necessity of choos-
ing how much freedom we want. We need not look to history to 
see the results of too little freedom; we can see it in the world 
around us. 
All this raises the question : "When is a man actually free to 
govern himself?" Must he merely have physical liberty? Increas-
ingly during the past century and a half we have said, "No, that 
is not enough." Beyond the basic physical aspects, we have de-
manded greater liberty in two major realms: education and eco-
nomics, with an increasing certainty that a man cannot be fit to 
govern himself if he is a slave to ignorance or poverty. 
The movement toward free popular education has rightly been 
regarded as fundamental to democratic self-government. Thomas 
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Jefferson and Horace Mann were not by .chance both pioneer edu-
cators and great democrats. In our own day we have relied upon 
free discussion by an educated and intelligent electorate as the 
best defense against dictatorship. 
This raises a fearsome question. With all our college degrees, 
high school diplomas, evening extension courses, how free are 
our minds ; how well educated are we to govern ourselves ? We 
frequently know little or nothing about the facts or even the issues 
of public life. Indeed, sometimes we make it a matter of pride 
not to clutter up our minds with the fancied "dirty facts" of politics. 
This is far from adequate intellectual preparation for our grave 
task of self-government. 
If a man cannot be free to govern himself unless his mind 
is inquiring and well educated, no more can he act with freedom 
and impartiality unless he is economically at liberty. A slave or 
a peon cannot govern himself. Neither can a man heavily in debt 
to a town squire or dependent for his living upon the personal 
whims of a city's single industrialist. This is why Franklin Roose-
velt saw the evils of a third of a nation ill housed, ill clothed, ill 
fed. This is why we have emphasized the needs of collective bar-
gaining and industrial democracy as prerequisites to political democ-
racy. 
Freedom for the individual is of no value unless it is put to 
use, and applied to making government better or more effective. 
There is no point in having the right to govern ourselves unless 
in fact we do so. Amazingly, however, in America less than a 
third of the people ordinarily participate in the governmental 
process, even to the extent of casting a vote every £out' years. I 
merely shall ask whether you voted last November, or whether 
you are even registered to vote. Connecticut voting percentages 
run high for this country, and yet only fifty-three per cent of her 
population are registered voters and two months ago only thirty-
nine per cent deemed self-government desirable enough or avail-
able enough to appear at the polling place. As I say, Connecticut 
runs high. Forty-five per cent of her population usually votes. 
In the nation as a whole it is thirty per cent, while in South Caro-
lina it is only six per cent. Obviously many of our citizens do not, 
cannot, or do not wish to govern themselves. 
There are other ways of self-government. Some, such as hold-
ing public office, are of limited availability to most of us. Perhaps 
we should ·not be condemned for failing to govern ourselves to 
that extent. But other means, such as letters in the press, telegrams 
to congressmen, activity in civic organizations, are open to all 
of us, yet few take advantage of them. Again I merely pose a 
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question: During the past month exactly how have you personally 
participated in the process of governing yourself ? If this process 
were not available to us, we should feel greatly oppressed. Like 
the 1776 Revolutionists or the modern French underground, we 
should fight for self-government. There is no reason for us to 
fail to use such a precious possession. 
Self-government, which gives us freedom, demands tolerance. 
It is a delusion to fight for liberty and then deny it in any way to 
another, be he of a minority race, religion, or state of mind. No 
true self-government can exist in this country while a Negro in 
Mississippi cannot vote, while a Japanese in California cannot 
own land, while a Communist in New York cannot vote for candi-
dates of his party, or while a Connecticut summer resort area can 
post signs reading "Christians only." They are not prohibitions 
of self-government to individuals because of intellectual reasons; 
they are denials of freedom to minorities as a whole, simply be-
cause those groups are claimed unfit to share the privileges which 
the majority normally enjoy. 
Self-government is liberty for us to participate and for others 
to participate. America has so much self-government that any 
lack, whether from voluntary laziness or majority bigotry, stands 
out all the more clearly. 
More than we normally realize, the day by day workings of 
American government are based on this freedom, tolerance, and 
participation. This is in contrast with authoritarian or dictatorial 
regimes in some other parts of the world. There can be tyranny 
of a majority as well as of an individual. Our system of govern-
ment demands that the ruling majority respect the freedom and 
participation of the minority. Only then can we secure the accom-
modation which keeps a healthy government operating. An out-
standing current example of this is found in the relations between 
president and congress. 
Acceptance of these rules is well ingrained in our domestic 
politics. It is much less firmly fixed in the politics of the inter-
national order, chiefly because we tend to consider the inter-
national as different from the domestic, rather than as an expan-
sion of it. The great danger in our political life today is that we 
may confuse self-government with localism. Even as a man living 
alone does not secure real self-government, but merely loses the 
advantages of cooperative society, so a town, a state, or even a 
nation cannot gain by lonely ~eparatism in the modern world. The 
conditions of present-day life drive nations, as well as people, 
together. 
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This means that true self-government cannot be maintained 
in the United States except through the realization that our politi-
cal unit has become larger. We do not lose independence when 
we strive to promote world freedom through the United Nations 
Organization, when we participate in the workings of that organi-
zation, when we are tolerant of the needs and aspirations of other 
nations. We are merely making a hard-headed acceptance of this 
as the best modern means of governing ourselves. 
Self-government is more than a theory or a principle. It is 
a desire and a faith, which has caused men to struggle against 
seemingly insuperable odds to obtain or maintain it. Most of us 
in America have, or may have, much of this gift without struggle. 
For that very reason, we should not lean back in comfort while 
our neighbors still do without. Some of us are greatly concerned 
with alien doctrines which seem to have greater appeal to the men 
of this earth than does our own political faith. In all our dealings 
with others, nothing can be s9 convincing to them as the sight of 
an American not content to rest upon the past-an American not 
satisfied until all its people truly possess self-government. Then 
and only then, can we present our ideal of government to others, 
confident that it will convince them, confident of its victory, a 
victory far greater than that of arms. 
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Self-Government in the Fourth French 
Republic 
by 
EDWARD F. HUMPHREY 
Over two thousand years ago Thucydides, one of the greatest 
of the Greek historians, observed that "Human nature is always 
the same," and surely all Greek history demonstrates that one 
of the strongest of man's motives is his innate desire for self-
government. But the German barbarians engulfed the Graeco-
Roman world to turn Europe into a cock-pit wherein "Security" 
became man's supreme need. Can self ... government ever be restored 
to Europe, still the world's cock-pit? Here is the great world prob-
lem of our day, the same one that has existed ever since the failure 
of Pax Ronianorum, the Roman peace. 
Throughout the ages, from the time of the Roman Republic 
to the American Revolution the peoples of Europe continued to 
strive for self-government, but only those that had fled to sites 
made secure by .geographical environment succeeded in attaining 
it. The Swiss established their republic in the inaccessible Alps. 
The Icelanders crossed the Norwegian Seas, just as the British 
colonists in America later crossed the Atlantic. 
France, the subject of our talk for this evening, had, mean-
while, developed into the world's strongest totalitarian military 
power. "I am the State!" declared the "Sun-King" Louis XIV, 
the "Grand Monarch." He may have believed all that but his 
French subjects, instructed in the world's leading university, the 
University of Paris, thought differently. "Man was born free, yet 
everywhere is in chains," wrote Jean Jacques Rosseau, while 
Montesquieu was calling for a French state patterned after the 
British constitution. And when the American colonies resisted 
King George's tyranny, all France sprang to the defense of self-
government, and a European movement for that same form of 
freedom was born in France to spread thence eastward in Europe 
and ultimately to encircle the globe, today, possibly, man's strongest 
political trait. 
Dr. Edward F. Humphrey, Northam Professor of History and Political 
Science, came to Trinity in 1915. He received his A.B. from the University 
of Minnesota, and his A.M. and Ph.D. from Columbia. Perhaps the best 
known of his writings is the Economic History of the United States. 
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The Revolution of 1789 gave to France, the leading European 
state, a shaky, a very shaky, constitutional republic, which lasted 
but a few years, but more to our purpose, it instilled in the hearts 
of the French nation a spirit of self-government that has proven 
the one permanent, uncompromising force in Europe's struggle 
toward liberty. "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" became the 
battle cry of the French nation ; the Marsellaise--"March on! 
To Liberty or Death !"-its battle hymn; the tricolors, red, white, 
and blue, its battle flag. No nation in the world is more deeply 
dedicated to self-government than France, no nation has had a 
stormier time defending it. For, beyond the Rhine, still lies Ger-
many, and free France has ever faced the threat of a foreign mili-
tary might, "the fury of the Teuton." 
On December 24, 1946, France at last definitely achieved her 
Fourth Republic. The first was of 1792, the second of 1848, the 
third of 1871, and now the fourth of 1946. Napoleon I overthrew 
the first in the interest of a world empire; Napoleon III destroyed 
the second to build a Liberal Empire, and Marshal Petain's Vichy 
regime promised a paternalistic defeatist prosperity state, based 
on the leadership principle, Hitler's leadership at that. All French 
history since 1789 has been a struggle between the principle of a 
managed state and self-government. At the moment the self-govern-
ment group is in the majority, even to the degree of repudiation 
of the "Free France" resistance leader Charles de Gaulle. Also, 
the ideology of a completely managed state, as reflected in Com-
munism is repudiated, even though its party is France's leading 
political group. The present balance between self-government and 
management is precarious. At the moment the Socialist Leon Blum 
typifies the Fourth Republic. His ideas have been canvassed in 
many campaigns and they have been chosen as those most nearly 
approaching the national average. These ideas are clearly expressed 
in two important political documents : M. Blum's own book, For 
all Mankind, written when the author was incarcerated in Ger-
many, and in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, which had 
been so laboriously worked out. 
For Americans the heart of M. Blum's work, For all Man-
kind-and please note the sweep of the title, including your part 
therein-is contained in the following excerpt. And here may I 
pay respect to the sponsors of this broadcast,. the D.A.R., whose 
ancestors with French aid did so much to establish the principles 
which M. Blum endorses. M. Blum writes, "My personal prefer-
ence is . for some system along American or Swiss lines-that 
is, founded on the separation and balance of powers. This means 
that sovereignty is divided and the executive can exercise within 
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its own sphere an independent and unbroken authority. These 
systems have given rise to stable governments and have, in ad-
dition, the great advantage of substituting for the somewhat ficti-
tious concept of governmental responsibility, which has always 
looked too large in our country, the much more real principle of 
supervision of the executive by the legislature. 
"Still following the American and Swiss models, I should like 
this conception of the functions of a central government to be 
allied to a strongly centrifugal development, which I would carry, 
indeed, to the point at which it becomes federalism. I have never 
been afraid of federalism. The individual states in America, the 
cantons in Switzerland, have both retained some share of demo-
cratic sovereignty, and they maintain the fires of local political 
life. They offer the public-spirited citizen adequate opportunities 
for a free and useful political life in his own locality. I am re-
minded, in this context, of life as it was lived in our former 
provinces. Moreover, I have always been attracted by the ideas 
put forward by Rathenau after the German collapse of 1918. 
Functional devolution has always seemed to me as essential as 
decentralization. In other words, a single executive authority, a 
single legislative body can no longer deal adequately with all the 
aspects of life in a modern state. We are led logically, therefore, 
to envisage the central authority, whose primary task is one of 
general direction and coordination, as becoming progressively sur-
rounded by smaller authorities with special fields, within which 
they have a limited independence . . . " 
Our second document, the Constitution of the Fourth Repub-
lic, differs radically from that of the Third, and it is profoundly 
less totalitarian than the Communist-inspired one originally pro-
posed but voted down by the French electorate. Still, it is a bit 
difficult to reconcile it with the United States prototype, which 
M. Blum praises. It is weak on checks and balances, and grants 
very extensive powers to the legislative assembly. The French 
president is still a figure-head. Its main innovations are, first, an 
extension of the democratic principle from the political to the 
social and economic fields, and, second, a provisory application 
of these ideals to France's colonial empire and even to the world 
at large. The new French Constitution now even becomes, in prin-
ciple, a part of the United Nations government as well as an in-
strument in our own domestic affairs, providing, of course, we 
are agreeable. 
As a national French document the new constitution carries 
as its preface a so-called "Rights of Man," a modernized version 
of the Revolutionary one adopted in 1789. It lists the old essential 
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freedoms of the individual, freedom of speech, worship, assem-
bly, belief, etc., and adds now for the first time the old, old British 
safeguard, the right of habeas corpus. New rights are offered as: · 
1. Every human being possesses, with regard to society, rights 
that guarantee, in the integrity and dignity of his person, his full 
physical, intellectual and moral development. 
2. The protection of health from the time of conception, the 
benefit of all hygienic measures and all care permitted by science 
are guaranteed to all and assured by the nation. 
3. The widest possible culture must be offered to all without 
other limitation than aptitudes of each one. . . . Education must 
be free and made accessible to all. 
4. The duration and conditions of work must in no way af-
fect the health, dignity, or the family life of the worker .... Men 
and women have the right to just remuneration ... and in any 
case to resources necessary for living worthily .... Everyone has 
the right to rest and leisure. . . . Everyone may belong to the 
union of his choice or not belong to any union at all." 
5. Every worker has the right to participate through the 
intermediary of his delegates in collective determination of con-
ditions of work as well as in the management of enterprises." 
Property rights are defined in Article XXXV, "ownership is 
the inviolable right to use, enjoy, and dispose of property guaran-
teed to all by law"; in Article XXXVI, "the right of ownership 
must not be exercised contrary to the social good .... Every piece 
of property, every enterprise whose exploitation has acquired 
characteristics of national public service or monopoly in fact must 
become the property of the community as a whole." 
Perhaps the most startling innovation of France's new con-
stitution is the one, Article XXXXVI, which advances into the 
realm of a world government-a constitutional world govern-
ment. Self-government for the entire globe. It reads: "Under the 
reserve of reciprocity France agrees to the limitations of sover-
eignty necessary for the organization and defense of peace." 
The provisions of the constitution which mark its advance in 
· the realm of colonial affairs offer a new conception of the rela-
tion of colonies and mother country in a "French Union/' Eng-
land's new term for this relationship is "commonwealth." One 
wonders whether the "French Union" ideal may not be a mite 
stronger than the "federation" form advocated by M. Blum. Off-
hand, under French auspices, it seems to carry infinitely greater 
external authority over so-called dependent peoples than does the 
British idea and to fall very far short of the "independence" ideal 
which the United States has always championed. 
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Amplifications of the French imperial idea, the new "French 
Union" plan, are given in considerable detail in the new constitu-
tion. The "Union" ~mbraces metropolitan France, her overseas 
territories, and Associated States, that is, protectorates. The Presi-
dent of the French Republic is ex officio President of the French 
Union, even though he is chosen by the French assembly. Under 
him is to be a High Council of the French Union to "assist the 
Government in the general conduct of the Union. This High Coun-
cil is to be composed of a "delegation of the French Government 
and representation of each of the Associated States." There is 
to be an Assembly of the Union, half of whose members will 
represent metropolitan France, and half the overseas territories 
and Associated States. The manner of selection of . these repre-
sentatives is still to be determined by organic law, i.e. solely by 
action of the metropolitan legislature. Other posts in the French 
Union are to be similarly created and governed. Thus, we see, 
local autonomy is to a very considerable degree restricted. 
However, the new constitution does promise the inhabitants 
of overseas territories the same status of citizenship as those of 
metropolitan France and the enjoyment of the rights -and liberties 
which they possess, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. 
Rudyard Kipling, the poet of British imperialism, in 1912, 
thus apostrophized France; as we may well do tonight: 
"Broke to every known mischance, lifted over all 
By the light sane joy of life, the buckler of the Gaul, 
Furious in luxury, merciless in toil, 
Terrible with strength renewed from a tireless soil, 
Strictest judge of her own worth, gentlest of man's mind, 
First to face the truth and last to leave old truths behind, 




GEORGE B. COOPER 
There is perhaps no country whose government is so hard to 
describe in concise terms as that of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland. At the outset I must take liberties with the 
announced title of my remarks "Self-government in England" and 
emphasize instead the governmental structure of the country. For 
"self-government" and "England" are from many points of view 
synonymous. From the external point of view the British have 
enjoyed nine hundred years of freedom from foreign domination. 
This may explain the persistence of the ideas of liberty and law 
which we associate with Great Britain. And in the internal sphere, 
if we interpret self-government as the rule of the majority of-
people, the British have been pioneers in that form of polity as 
well. The principle that the sovereign is under the law and the 
idea that certain important bodies in the population must first 
give their consent to legislation both have roots in distant English 
history. Since 1832, a gradual but steady extension of suffrage has 
made the most important political body in England the people 
themselves. For Americans, the problem in regard to British gov-
ernment as I see it ( and I am basing my idea of the problem on 
the questions that have been put to me since my return home)-
the problem is to comprehend the complex and unique workings 
of a system which at first glance appears to be filled with anomalies 
and paradoxes. 
The presence, for example, of an hereditary aristocracy and 
House of Lords, the existence of an Established Church and of 
a monarchy all tend to convey a picture which is outside our politi-
cal experience. But the House of Lords has no real power, the 
King reigns but must not govern, and despite an Established 
Church, religious freedom is as complete as it is in the United 
States. Despite the trappings of monarchy and absolutism we can-
not help but remark that the quick and sensitive response of the 
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1943. In 1944 he was transferred to the State Department and became Vice 
Consul in the London Embassy. He returned to Trinity last September and 
specializes in English and European History. He has been promoted to As-
sistant Professor to take effect the academic year 1947-48. 
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British system to the General Election of 1945 reveals that the 
will of the people in England is translated into action much more 
quickly on many occasions than it is in the United States. 
The reason for these inconsistencies may be found in a num-
ber of factors which repay investigation. In the first place there 
has been a long period of historical development in which English 
political institutions have gradually evolved. Whereas our own 
development has taken place in a circumscribed period of a few 
hundred years and is therefore marked by familiar patterns of 
modern thought, Britain's evolution has spread over a period of 
more than a thousand years. Indeed, it begins in the seventh century 
if we take the first written law as a beginning. English law and 
constitutions bear the indelible marks of every great period in 
Br~tish history. The English grew up to every constitutional change 
they made. History and law are therefore imperceptibly blended. 
The reverse of this process has led to failure in many countries. 
We are all acquainted with the comic tragedy of certain Balkan 
constitutional monarchies which tried to create overnight the deli-
cate balance which has been achieved in England by peaceful and 
sometimes violent development over a period of many centuries. 
English freedom is Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Glor-
ious Revolution of 1688, the whig supremacy of the 18th century 
and all of the economic, social and spiritual background that pro-
duced these events. 
Another factor that must be borne in mind is the absence, quite 
amazing to us, of a written constitution. There is no document 
embodying the fundamental principles of the constitution. Its 
smooth working depends upon custom and precedent and most 
important of all-the good will and common sense of the people 
who govern. A high premium is inevitably placed on statesmanship 
in such a system. I always felt, while observing the House of 
Commons at work, that the ambiguity of the constitution and its 
arrangements was the best education that any level-headed people 
could have in self-government. In America our written and closely 
defined constitution is our great safeguard. We could not have 
wielded together the great Republic without it. The problem in 
England was different, and the devices employed there are as 
essential to their life as our constitution is to ours. 
The last general fact that I should like to stress may be at 
the bottom of a good deal of American misunderstanding of 
British political life. That is: the tendency to preserve outward 
forms even when the inner substance is changed. Relics of past 
ages survive in Britain long after they have lost their original 
significance and have been overlaid by modern arrangements. There 
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are many forms in the British government, for instance, which 
are only tolerated because the opportunities they offer are not 
pressed to their logical conclusion. The example that springs to 
mind at once is the whole concept of the Crown. The concentra-
tion of great power- prerogative and statutory-in the Crown, 
which is personified by His Majesty the King, would be a dan-
gerous thing in most European countries. By means of the device 
of the cabinet, a democratically elected House of Commons con-
trols the Crown. It may be the voice of His Majesty that reads 
the speech from the Throne but the words are those of the leaders 
of the majority party. The majority party of course is the voice 
of the great electorate. Let us take a concrete example of the 
way in which this operates: after the election the King calls 
the leader of the victorious party and asks him to form a govern-
ment. The majority leader, who becomes prime minister, an-
nounces his cabinet- foreign secretary, home secretary, chan-
cellor of the exchequer, first lord of the admiralty, and others 
who are chosen from influential members of the party in the 
Commons. At one time these offices were filled by the King's 
personal servants, responsible to him and a great instrument 
of despotism. But the Commons, over a period of centuries, has 
wrested these offices away from the King. Today, although Mr. 
Bevin is called His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs he is actually a Labour member of parliament 
responsible to a Labour cabinet and ultimately to the people. But 
the British keep the old forms and Mr. Bevin, as Secretary of 
State, exercises the royal prerogative in foreign affairs. If the 
King so much as suggested, however, that an ambassador be 
changed or an obscure vice consul be relieved of his duties there 
would probably be a minor constitution crisis. Theoretically the 
King is the fountain of honor and the source of mercy. But titles 
of honor are apportioned by the cabinet. Mercy, in the form of 
pardons, is exercised by the home secretary despite the fact that 
the official document reads, "His Majesty has been graciously 
pleased to pardon John Doe." The language may be regal but 
the authorization is not. Throughout English life one sees the 
terminology of absolutism-His Majesty's Ship, His Majesty's 
Embassy, His Majesty's Government. If we substitute the word 
'~British" for "His Majesty" we see the real picture. 
I have dealt so far with political institutions. These institu-
tions off er great opportunities for self-government and popular 
participation in the conduct of public affairs. But such opportunities 
may be quite unreal unless the institutions are supported by cer-
tain types of personal freedom which are essential if democratic 
government is to be effective. The liberty of the subject is jealously 
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guarded in England-not by written guarantees· because in most 
cases they do not exist-but by practice which over a period of 
centuries has woven itself into the very social fabric of English 
life. Men have talked and fought in England for freedom from 
arbitrary arrest, for freedom of speech and assembly and every 
time, they have done more than put these concepts on paper-they 
have fitted them in as integral parts of life itself. Any hint of an 
infraction of individual liberty or arbitrary treatment is immedi-
ately assailed. An unwarranted detention in the north of England, 
a slight suspicion of curtailment of freedom of speech in Wales 
brings forth an immediate question in the House of Commons. 
National attention always centers on such questions no matter 
how remote the village happens to be. There is a central concern 
for the liberty of the subject which we in America might study 
with profit. Too many times Americans suffer infringement of 
liberty because they live in sections of the country in which the 
social, economic and political traditions have provided inadequate 
or unsympathetic power to protect rights. The defense of civil 
liberties is a patriotic duty in England, as it is in our own country. 
Both countries must be on guard against a tendency to look upon 
def enders of civil liberty in an unfavorable light, as many people 
do when dealing with groups or individuals that they do not like 
personally. Liberty, like Peace, is indivisible. The passion which 
most of us have for the preservation . of our rights is a heritage 
which both British and Americans must always guard with vigi-
lance. 
The debt which we in America owe to Britain for so many 
of our political and legal attitudes suggests the role of Britain 
as a great source of the rule of law. In modern times the law 
has been "pumped," if I may use a mechanical phrase, to many 
parts of the world through the device of the Commonwealth. 
Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand have been 
raised to a level of political and legal achievement which is unique. 
It is remarkable, for example, that Australia, situated in the south-
west Pacific where political liberty could not be expected to grow 
ordinarily, has been raised in our own time to the rank of a demo-
cratic, self-governing state in which the ideals of an older civili-
zation are grafted so successfully. Britain has been the parent 
of a half dozen successful democracies. The Commonwealth device 
has called into being a half dozen states based on the rule of law. 
In every realm of governmental activity the dominions are sov-
ereign states. The United Kingdom itself is a dominion no more 
no less. 
In a world which has been fighting for unity for so many 
hundreds of years the British Commonwealth is a worthy exam-
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ple for study. We know that there are at least six sovereign states 
that will not go to war with each other. And since the United States 
could not conceivably war with the Commonwealth, as our extra-
ordinary relations with Canada and the United Kingdom have 
demonstrated many times, there are at least seven powers which 
form the nucleus of world peace, and are bound together by certain 
ideals which we can call English-speaking, for accuracy's sake. 
Within the structure of the governmental system I have de-
scribed there are of course many problems. The British have suf-
fered during the past war. And when the war ended austerity 
continued. Like ourselves they turned all of their efforts to win-
ning the war. More than ourselves they expended a great deal 
of their national treasure. In the summer of 1945, soon after the 
victory in Europe, the British government became a Labour gov-
ernment as the result of a democratically conducted election which 
observed all of the constitutional rubrics and was carried out in 
the usual constitutional way. The people of Britain had been pre-
sented with a Labour platform, they voted for it, and as should 
happen in a free society, they got it. The economic arrangements 
of the party are important. It is going to be a difficult job to re-
concile some of the proposals put forward and the whole concept 
of the free Englishman. Exchange controls and subsequent re-
strictions on foreign travel are only two of the many spheres that 
Englishmen must watch with care. But the Labour home secre-
tary is just as zealous as any other in his defense of civil liberties. 
And the last time I saw the House of Commons at work it ap-
peared to be carrying on in the best parliamentary tradition. What 
is called socialism in Britain is very British. It fortunately lacks 
the doctrinaire quality that one associates with the word in the 
economics books. The Labour victory was in part a protest against 
inequalities of wealth and opportunity which still possess enormous 
dimensions in England. The victory may also be a peculiar British 
way of solving a British problem-namely an adverse balance 
of trade and the need to modernize industries that have fallen 
behind those of other countries. Britain has always been a pioneer 
in making certain necessary social and economic changes com-
patible with democracy. Witness the network of social services 
which started there forty years ago when the subject was not 
even part of American political vocabulary. I believe that nationali-
zation is a dangerous and precarious field in which to venture. 
But it has come to Britain, as all students of affairs will watch with 
interest the methods the English pursue in order to graft a new 
economy on to a free society. Those who know Britain know that 
they will do it carefully and slowly. It will be done to pace of 
coroneted peers, many of whom are socialists themselves, and 
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when it is complete it will probably be much milder than even its 
moderate critics predict. The British are not trying to export 
their ideas about nationalization because the ideas are not part 
of a systematic ideology. Nationalization may be their response 
to a number of problems that are peculiar to British geography, 
history and habits. Those who know Britain and America must 
know that there is no more likelihood of our absorbing the Labour 





SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN 
I chose the title "British Freedom" because it recalls some 
words used in Edmund Burke's speech on concilation with Amer-
ica-a speech which is part of the common heritage of our two 
countries. The title suggests two questions, firstly, why does free-
dom require any qualifying description at all, whether British, 
American, French or any other kind of adjective. Isn't it just 
freedom? 
Secondly, admitting the adjective, what does "British" mean? 
What is there particular and specific about British freedom? 
The answer to the first question is that there are two kinds 
of freedom which are always getting mixed up in discussions on 
the subject. As we are fortunate in having in our common language 
two separate words, freedom, which is of Anglo-Saxon origin, 
and liberty, which is of Latin origin, I ain going to make the 
daring proposal, that, for the purposes of this discussion at any 
rate, we use freedom for the one kind of freedom and liberty for 
the other. 
The first kind of freedom is just freedom-the condition of 
being free. Anyone who has been a prisoner or who has even 
been confined in a hospital knows what freedom, in this sense, 
means. It is the opposite of being under restraint. It is feeling 
able to do anything you please, with any adjectives or adverbs you 
may like to add to that description. If you want a short but rather 
less racy definition, let us say that "Freedom is the sense of the 
continuous possibility of initiative." There is nothing to prevent 
you from taking a trip around the world or standing for Congress 
or setting up in business-except possibly lack of inclination or 
the state of your purse, and these are nobody's concern but your 
own. 
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But freedom in this sense does not carry you very far. It is 
no more than a sort of jumping off board. Everything depends 
on the use you make of this individual freedom and of the condi-
tion in which you exercise it. 
It is here that the second sense of the word comes in, the sense 
for which I would reserve the use of the word, liberty. 
Liberty is not an individual word, but a social word. It does 
not describe an individual state of mind-how an individual feels 
free: perhaps that is why there is no adjective attached to the 
word "liberty." You can't talk of feeling "libertish." Liberty is 
so_mething outside us. It is part of the social order, one of the 
benefits safeguarded for us by the Constitution and laws of our 
country and those responsible for their maintenance-in most 
civilized countries, the courts of law and the judges. 
In what does liberty consist? Attempts have recent!y been 
made in very high quarters to answer that question in the shape 
of a list of what are called fundamental freedoms-let us say, basic 
liberties-liberty of speech, liberty of association, liberty of wor-
ship and the rest. I won't recapitulate them in detail. You can 
sum up the' whole series by saying that liberty is partly negative 
and partly positive : it is liberty from and liberty to-liberty from 
arbitrary arrest or any other form of injustice by the state and 
from molestation without just cause by a fell ow citizen : and 
liberty to · engage in any lawful activity-that is any activity not 
inter£ ering with the liberty of any other citizen; and such lawful 
activity may be either private or public: in all countries where 
liberty is part of the social order such public activities include 
participation in the affairs of government by the exercise of the 
vote and in other ways. 
This is the liberty to which the statue in New York Harbor 
beckons the incoming stranger. The United States is a country 
which guarantees liberty to its inhabitants and the guarantee is 
safeguarded by the Constitution. But the United S~ates is also 
a country which gives dwellers in it freedom-it makes theni feel 
free. The ·liberty which is written in paper documents doesn't 
remain as it does in some countries, a promise honored in the 
breach rather than in the observance. It radiates from the printed 
page to the minds and hearts of citizens, stimulating their activities 
and giving warmth and color to their lives. The constitutional 
l_iberty which makes men feel free also makes men feel that life 
is worth living because it is theirs to use as they think fit, theirs 
to make, or to mar. 
Part of that inner freedom which gives such tone and zest 
to life in the United States consists in the sense that a native born 
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citizen and the son of any citizen may become President. This pos-
sibility of becoming President is part of the system of liberty in the 
United States and not part of the system of liberty in Great Britain. 
Here we pass beyond the generalities of the basic liberties-the 
liberties from and the liberties to and reach something specific, 
which is American and not British-American not simply in the 
sense of belonging to the United States but belonging to all the 
American republics. There is a word which is badly missing: an 
adjective to denote the Western hemisphere as a whole, minus Can-
ada. For the Canadian system of liberty is substantially the same as 
that of Great Britain. No Canadian boy can aspire to become 
President. But he can aspire to become Prime Minister and re-
main so for some twenty years, as the present Prime Minister, 
Mr. Mackenzie King, has succeeded in demonstrating. 
What then is British liberty? The first thing to observe-and 
this will surprise some of you-is that at the time when Edmund 
Burke spoke so confidently about British liberty, Great Britain was 
not a democracy, was indeed very far from being a democracy. 
It was a country in which the vote was restricted to a small propor-
tion of the adult inhabitants. Thus for Burke liberty was not the 
same thing as democracy, as some people consider today, nor was 
it even a necessary consequence of democracy, as some other people 
consider: it was something that you could have without any democ-
racy at all. 
Now, Burke's conception of British liberty is not at all that 
of Englishmen today, whether they belong to the Labour Party 
or are Conservatives. It has become completely out of date-in 
Great Britain. But it is very important to remember what Burke 
felt about liberty because this gives us a historical clue for the 
understanding of the development of the idea of British liberty. 
What Burke meant by liberty was what we call today civil liberty, 
as contrasted with political liberty. Civil liberty includes all the 
usual liberties from but leaves out some of the more important 
liberties to, .including liberty to participate in the government of 
the country. 
Well, you will say that Burke's liberty is a very poor kind of 
liberty. Are you quite sure? What is there to be said in defence 
of it? 
The first thing that is to be said in its defence is that civil 
liberty, as it grew up under English conditions, has been the 
nursery of political liberty not only in England but in most of 
the countries where political liberty exists in the world today. 
Civil liberty by itself may be a dead thing written in a book-a 
standard form of words: but civil liberty as it grew up in Eng-
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land has had and still has the same stimulating and radiating 
quality that a more complete system of liberty has in the United 
States. The guardian of civil liberty in England is the House of 
Commons, that unreformed House of which Burke was a mem-
ber; and had it not been for the House of Commons, there would 
have been no John Hampden and had there been no John Hamp-
den there would have been no George Washington. Civil liberty 
is not only the foundation on which political liberty can be erected 
at a later stage : it is the only foundation on which political liberty 
can be erected. The Europe of the inter-war years and of today 
provides instances enough and to spare of people who have tried 
to secure for themselves political liberty without having gone 
through the apprenticeship stage of civil liberty. The result is 
bound to be a disaster : sometimes the disaster is veiled by a sham, 
sometimes it is open. But the result on the mind of the citizen 
is the same in each case: he does not feel free. He does not feel 
any more free under a system where the government manages 
the elections than he does when the government is unashamedly 
autocratic. You can have the forms of liberty without freedom; 
but you can't have political liberty in any real sense without the 
inner zest of freedom. 
But how is it possible then, you will ask, that there should 
today be so many countries under British rule which don't enjoy 
political liberty, as it is understood in the United States? How do 
you explain the fact that even the Labour Party, which is prepar-
ing to abandon India, proposes to go on governing the rest of the 
British dependent empire in Asia, Africa and America without 
granting its inhabitants full political rights? 
My answer is that we in England have never believed in politi-
cal liberty as a right. We have always considered it as a responsi-
bility-and a responsibility which should be laid on the shoulder 
of no man, or set of men, until it was tolerably clear, or reasonable 
to assume, that they were fit to exercise it. Because bad govern-
ment is a cause of such terrible human suffering. Thus British 
liberty has always been granted by instalments, in graduated doses, 
so to speak. And the British Colonial Empire at any given moment 
presents a picture of a large number of different communities 
at different stages of their apprenticeship to full political liberty 
or, as we call it, full responsible government. We went through 
that process in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa 
and have no reason to be dissatisfied with the results of this edu-
cational method. We had even attempted it earlier-in a rather 
rudimentary manner, I must admit-in certain colonies to the 
south of Canada. But how, I ask, did the authors of the Federalist 
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learn their wisdom? Did all come to them after 1776 or had they 
learnt at least some of it under the stimulating--or shall I say 
provoking-influence of British rule? It is the quality of a good 
schoolmaster to be provoking. B~itish liberty provoked Hamilton 
and Madison in the eighteenth century as it has provoked Pandit 
Nehru and Mr. Jinnah in the twentieth. Are we ashamed that 
we had to provoke them so thoroughly before we decided that the 
,right moment had come to hand over to them the skilled task of 
governing 400 million human beings? No, we are not ashamed 
at all: we are proud, proud of what has been achieved in India 
by a small handful of skilled administrators under conditions of 
civil liberty, but proud also of having been true to the maxim 
"Self-government is better than good government"-a maxim 
which, since the lesson we learnt from you in the War of Inde-
pendence, we have always been ready to apply, provided that we 
were reasonably confident that self-government would really be 
government and not. chaos. For to govern means to steer a ship-
a gouvernail is a rudder : there can be no government when the 
ship of state is adrift and liable to sink. 
Let me come back in conclusion from liberty to freedom. Is 
there such a thing as British freedom-such a. thing as feeling 
free in the British manner? Yes, I make bold to say that there is. 
If you want to-how shall I say-breathe the air of British free-
dom, to feel free with the British-go to sea on a British ship and 
live on it for long enough to become acclimatized. Then you will 
understand two things-firstly, the relationship between sea-power 
and British liberty-that liberty which English seamen first pre-
served and then helped to maintain. And secondly, what is the 
specific quality of British liberty: it is impregnated with salt water 
and with the tradition of the British Navy, that Navy which 
boarded the slaveships and rescued thousands of their miserable 
passengers before other countries-even countries with super-fine 
constitutions-took any interest in their fate; that Navy which 
has always considered the cause of the liberty that is guaranteed 
as inseparable from that of fundamental human decency. 
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The Possibility of a Democratic Government 
in Germany 
by 
ALBERT E. HOLLAND 
We Americans have yet to learn that democracy cannot be 
handed to people on a silver platter and that people cannot be given 
independence. Democracy-as the other speakers in this series 
have pointed out--cannot be given to anyone. It must be earned, 
it must be fought for, as we earned it and fought for it over a 
long period of time. Democracy as a way of life is the reflection 
of the spirit of the people who developed it. In our country this 
way of life is best characterized by the primacy of the rights of 
the individual : the right to come and go as he wills, the right to 
work in the field of his choice, the right to worship God in his 
own fashion. Naturally, we believe all individuals have the same 
rights. 
What about the Germans? Is democracy possible in Germany 
today? That is, democracy as a way of life and not as an election 
technique? We cannot answer this question without answering 
first a number of other, very important questions. The first is: 
What is the nature of the German people 't 
The characteristic I noted first when I went to Germany was 
a touchiness and an envy of others. The Germans cannot endure 
criticism no matter how impartial it may be. It is, I think, very 
significant that the Germans have produced no great satirists with 
the possible exception of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg in the 
Eighteenth Century and the Twentieth Century Austrian, Karl 
Kraus. 
The Germans have undue ,;espect for authority, especially 
when a4thority wears a uniform. It is said in Germany that life 
there is run by the "Radfahrenprinzip" or, literally translated, "the 
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bicycle principle." The man on top always grinds down the man 
beneath him and that man takes it out on a fellow a step lower, 
and so on down the line. 
The Germans are a servile people. This may be due to the 
fact that serfdom was abolished not quite 100 years ago. There 
is a parallel to this in our own country. Only a few generations 
ago our ancestors were still fighting the Indians and opening up 
the West. The result is that Americans today are quick to vio-
lence. Well, the great-grandfather of the average German was 
in many ways a slave. The result is that the German is unduly 
subservient to authority. 
There is a certain lack of balance, an inner insecurity among 
the German people. They plunge feverishly into every sort of 
craze-whether it be the latest style in jazz or the latest fashion 
in dictators. There is a tendency in all Germans to go to extremes. 
The reverse of the servile spirit is the spirit of ruthless tyranny. 
The Germans take a peculiar delight in the order and discip-
line of marching columns. Every day, in Berlin, there was at noon 
a changing of the guard at the Ehrenmal, the shrine to the Ger-
man dead of World War I. Through the Brandenburg gate would 
march a company of infantry and before them a military band 
playing those martial airs for which Germany is so famous. Ger-
man civilians would leave their offices, go down to the streets-
not to watch the parade but to march along with the soldiers. I 
have seen tots of five and grandmothers of eighty keep perfect 
step. 
These qualities, then: touchiness, undue respect for authority, 
servility, lack of balance, grinding down the man below-are these 
the qualities of a democratic people? 
The second question we must ask is: What is the Germans' 
idea of good? To answer this question fully would take a whole 
series of lectures. In his admirable book, The Meeting of East and 
W est, Professor Northrop has summarized German philosophy 
and its importance in the development of present-day Germany. 
He points out that the German philosopher Fichte taught that 
moral life centers in the will and not in knowledge and reason. 
Fichte wrote, "All our thought is founded on our impulses-as a 
man's affections are, so is his knowledge." Northrop shows how this 
teaching of Fichte's was carried on by Hegel who taught that that 
man is best who dominates by force of will. In describing this 
man, Hegel adds, "he is devoted to the one aim regardless of all 
else. It is even possible that (he) may treat other, even sacred 
interests, inconsiderately-conduct which is indeed obnoxious to 
moral reprehension. But so mighty a form must trample down 
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many an innocent flower-crush to pieces many an object in the 
path." 
But surely capricious and arbitrary freedom can only produce 
tyranny in which all guarantees of freedom are abandoned. And 
this is what happened in Germany. 
Hegel also hailed the Prussian state as the concrete manifesta-
tion of the Absolute Spirit. German messianism dates from this. 
The Germans took it for granted that German Kultur was by its 
very nature supreme and destined to sweep the entire world. The 
Germans were the chosen people. In other words, as Sir Alfred 
Zimmern has said, the Germans mixed culture with politics. 
Are these teachings compatible with the democratic way of 
life? 
The third question we must answer is: What have been the 
main trends in German history! 
At the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648, large portions 
of what is now Germany were destroyed. A new Germany was 
born-a still-born Germany composed of a mass of free cities, 
principalities, and imperial knights with no spiritual or political 
unity. The Holy Roman Empire was dead, and the Treaty of 
Westphalia provided that the constituent states of the Empire 
could handle their own foreign affairs. This was the basis for the 
rise of one of these states, Prussia, to a position of great power. 
The work of The Great Elector, of Frederick I and of Frederick 
William I prepared the way for the triumphs of Frederick the 
Great under whom in 1740 Prussia burst forth upon the continent 
as an overwhelming force. All eyes in Germany tur!]-ed towards 
this state whose enlightened autocracy was such a contrast to the 
corrupt life in the other German states. 
About the middle of the eighteenth century there were signs 
of intellectual awakening in Germany. There began at this time 
a period which can indeed be called the German Century. This 
golden age of classicism was characterized by tolerance, anti-mili-
tarism, liberalism, and especially by world citizenship. Men like 
Goethe did not consider themselves Germans ; they were primarily 
Europeans. 
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars had two 
effects on Germany. First of all, the number of states was radi-
cally reduced. Secondly, as the center of resistance to Napoleon, 
Prussia again took the center of the stage. The reforms of Stein 
and Hardenberg-typically doing from above what the French 
· had done from below-exerted great influence on the other states 
and hopes of political liberty were widespread. However, these 
hopes were dashed by the system set up at the Congress of Vienna. 
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The Germanic Federation or Bund became a reactionary body 
under the domination of Austria. The aspirations of the German 
people were ignored. 
Intellectually, the nineteenth century-at least in ifs early 
stages-was dominated by two trends: the so-called "Sturm and 
Drang" and Romanticism. The writers of the storm and stress 
school accepted the ideas and social reforms of the French Revo-
lution. Reason was their God and convention their greatest enemy. 
The Romanticists, who based themselves on the work of Fichte, 
were ardent nationalists. They despised reason and worshipped 
the unhindered will. In their efforts to arouse national spirit they 
went to the past and revived the sagas of Wotan and Thor, the 
gods of the S.S. The confusion of culture with politics led later 
to anti-semitism and to power politics. 
In 1848, a wave of revolution swept Europe. In Germany, 
it resulted in the attempt of the Frankfurt Parliament to win 
union and liberty by parliamentary methods. This attempt failed 
due to the refusal of Frederick William IV of Prussia to accept 
the leadership of the new union and due to the refusal of Austria 
to surrender her dominant position. Most of the liberal leaders 
were executed or were forced to emigrate. Many of them, includ-
ing men like Karl Schurz, came to the United States. 
The conflict between Prussia and Austria for domination of 
Germany was solved by Bismarck. In three deliberately provoked 
wars he forced Austria out of Germany and united the German 
states in a German Empire under the Prussian king, William I. 
In the years following, all liberal thought was killed as was the 
German lyric spirit. No attention was paid to poets like Stefan 
George, Rainer Maria Rilke or to the satirist, Kraus, who pointed 
out the inevitable results of this policy of untrammeled power. 
The def eat of Germany in World War I brought about the 
abdication of William II, and the W eim~r Republic was formed. 
But it was in no sense of the word a republic. Within a few years, 
as we can read in the autobiography of General von Seeckt, the 
army was back in power. In fact, the leaders of the epublic 
called upon the army to eliminate the more radical elements. As 
Henry Morgenthau says, it is typical of the German attitude 
towards democracy that the leaders of the Republic should turn to 
the army and not to the people. Americans who say that we should 
insist on re-establishing the Weimar Republic are calling for a 
return to dictatorship. 
The rise of Hitler with the support of the army and the leaders 
of industry is well-known to all of you. I should like to add only 
that Hitler was supported by over 80% of the German people from 
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1936 on, and that the efforts to assassinate Hitler during this last 
war were not because of any opposition to dictatorship but because 
his military leadership was losing the war. 
Even this very brief outline of German history shows how 
liberal · movements and attempts to gain political liberty have 
failed. Does this history give any reasons for believing that a 
democratic form of government is possible in Germany at the 
present time ? 
I believe that by their nature, by the teachings they have ab-
sorbed, and by their history, the German people today are abso-
lutely unfitted for democratic government. 
This belief is strengthened by the reports which have been 
made about the impact of the Nazis on the German people. The 
Nazis set up a new ruling class consisting of party members and 
the bureaucracy . . The mass of the people were regimented and 
subordinated to the state. The horrifying tortures of the Jewish 
people and other elements of the people were known to almost 
all Germans. They did nothing. This bestiality seems to have af-
fected large numbers of Germans. The influence of Christianity 
was greatly weakened by preventing the youth from receiving 
religious instruction. The destructive elements from the past were 
introduced and made law. 
What about the future? Will democracy ever be possible in 
Germany? I cannot answer this question. Perhaps if we insist on 
total disarmament and political decentralization of Germany; if 
we do not insist on imposing democracy before it is possible; if 
we aid in reopening the universities, the churches and the schools; 
if we supply books; if later on we arrange for exchange of pro-
fessors and students; if we send our best men to Germany to 
work in the American Military Government; .if we do all these 
things, then, perhaps, the Germans will find the path back to moral 
and spiritual health. But the main effort must come from the 
German people. They alone can bring forth a new life in their 
country. 
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Government 1n the United Nations 
by 
ROGER SHAW 
We members of the patriotic societies are, first of all, Ameri-
can nationalists. If we did not believe in America, first, last, and 
all the time, we would not trouble to join these patriotic groups. 
We are not much swayed by popular prejudices, and mass clamours. 
Generally speaking, we do what we think is right and best for the 
country in which we have spent a century, or two, or three. If 
isolation seems the best thing for America, then we are isolation-
ists. If, on the other hand, the newfangled inter-nationalism seems 
the best thing for the Americans, then we become most determined 
internationalists. If it really is "All One World"-as my fraternity 
brother, Wendell Willkie, told me-then we can well afford to 
pose as nationalists, within an international scheme of things. . .. 
Generally speaking, History moves somewhat as follows: There 
is always an aggressor nation. This nation is strong and brutal, 
tough, and on the make. It proves a great menace to many other 
nations, all at the same time. Then, there is a grande alliance 
against the aggressor. The allies pledge eternal friendship, and 
lasting mutual love. This is a species of inter-nationalism. They 
say they are waging a war to end war. But at the end of a world 
war, the strongest member of the alliance generally emerges as 
the next aggressor. Then, the other allies, plus the defeated coun-
tries, form a new grande alliance, to check the new aggressor. 
This is an eternal cycle-an historical pattern that has continued 
with regularity since the Middle Ages. . . . 
First, the old Holy Roman Empire gave way to modern national 
states. Then, the allies beat imperial Spain, and France emerged. 
Then England worsted France, and after that, Napoleonic France 
took the lead again. After that, in the last century, it was Czarist 
Russia's turn, and then Germany made two bids for power. Now, 
it seems to be Russia's turn again. Only, this time it is a red Rus-
sia, instead of a white one. Across the dim horizons of future time, 
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loom up the vast numbers and unorganized resources of China and 
India. Little planet, what now? 
Today, there seem to be-quite roughly-three schools of 
thought. The first of these schools demands that America stand on 
her own two feet. This school expects more trouble, in the natural 
sequence of History, and pays great attention to General Wash-
ington's Farewell Address. Some of the members of this school 
consider General Washington a better foreign minister than Gen-
eral Marshall. This school seems to be out of date·, and many 
people laugh at it. They say that General Washington, and his 
secretary, General Hamilton, were a pair of old fogies. Perhaps 
they were-that is a matter of opinion, in a free country. However, 
many millions qf people have a high regard for these two men. 
The second school is the United Nations school of thought. 
This group seems to believe that the world should be run by a 
Council of Ambassadors, and an international army. They do not 
seem to agree about who shall own and operate the international 
army, and of course, an international army cannot be really inter-
national, or it would not be an army. However, modern minds 
mostly agree that the United Nations is better than nothing-
although some people object to doing business with the not al-
together attractive Soviet Union. They say that to endorse the 
U. N. is to endorse Soviet atheism, and to approve the hideous 
slave-camps of Siberia. Perhaps they are all wrong about this. 
The third school believes that we should have, like Alfred 
Tennyson, a parliament or popular merger, of all mankind. This, 
they say, is democratic and truly progressive. It probably is. But 
even this Utopian scheme has its drawbacks. For one thing, there 
are far more colored people in the world than non-colored people. 
The colored people are very overcrowded. They could easily vote, 
in the world parliament, that America should open wide its doors 
to universal immigration. They could win any such election, be-
cause they have a very considerable majority of the world's popu-
lation on their side. And if the colored peoples did not q.ave a 
heavy majority in the world parliament, then the world parliament 
would be an absolute fraud and farce. 
The United Nations, then, is the middle of the road policy. All 
life is a compromise, and democracy especially is a compromise. 
Mankind ha perhaps come to realize that going to extremes-
either of right, or wrong-kills too many people. It is possible, 
under the United Nations, to retain a fair amount of self-govern-
ment, if we have tough and patriotic ambassadors to · defend our 
national interests. There is not too much danger, under the United 
Nations, that the Soviets, or the Chinese and Indians, will regu-
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late our domestic problems for us. There is, perhaps, a consider-
able amount of hypocrisy under the U. N. regime, but that, of 
course, is unavoidable. We must never accuse hypocrites of being 
fellow-travelers, for that would be grossly unfair. 
Actually, a U. N. enthusiast and a fellow-traveler are quite 
different. A true U. N. enthusiast cheers for the international 
organization, through thick and thin, while a fellow-traveler only 
cheers when it favors Russia. There is a basic conflict, of course, 
between self-government and international control; just as there 
was once a basic conflict between states rights and federal control 
in the U . S. A. Under the highly democratic world parliament 
scheme, there would be practically no self-government. Self-gov-
ernment and democracy are by no means the same thing. The 
achievement of heaven on earth consists more in giving than in 
getting-and how many of us are prepared for any such contin-
gencies? Perhaps, not too many. Most people are more in favor 
of highballs and spare tires, and nylons and lipsticks, than they 
are in any sort of true international or inter-racial equality. This 
is very wrong indeed, but we will have to take American human 
nature as it is, and not as Henry W allac~ thinks it should be. 
Perhaps much of our thinking about self-government and the 
U. N. is a trifle premature. Wars are not, as a rule, prevented 
by passing laws; and bullets are not deflected by resolutions and 
pious vetoes. It will be remembered that almost the last act of the 
worthy League of Nations, in 1939, was kicking out Russia for 
attacking' gallant little Finland. This League action did not, how-
ever, much deter Comrade Stalin from doing his worst. And now, 
presto-chango, we find the same Comrade Stalin, and his friends, 
as a stalwart pillar of the new U. N. international order. And one 
feels, somehow, that Finland has less self-government than she 
had before the United Nations was founded. 
Of course, it may be a good thing to get all the hostile world 
forces, and herd them together in the U. N. Here they can cuss 
and discuss, and blow off steam and butt their heads together. 
Meanwhile,, nobody is shot and killed except, perhaps, the people 
in Palestine, and those on the wrong side of the so-called Iron 
Curtain. Every parliament has its radicals and its Tories and its 
moderates, and so has the U. N. The Russians make up the extreme 
le£ t, the Americans the extreme right, and the badly battered 
French and English and small fry sit in the center. The Germans 
have taken the place of the Hindus, as outcast native colonials. 
Slavery has been brought back into play, but today the slaves are 
white, and no longer colored. 
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Just the same, the U. N. is trying to promote self-government 
a best it can. For instance, in the matter of trusteeship over orphan 
territories of various sorts, the U. N. charter reads-"to promote 
the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of 
the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive de-
velopment towards self-government or independence as may be 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and 
its peoples, and the freely expressed · wishes of the peoples con-
cerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship 
agreement." 
The world, quite frankly, cannot afford a third world war. The 
world is equally unwilling to give up self-government. Yet, many 
observers are claiming today that freedom from wars and free-
dom of governments are quite incompatible. You cannot have your 
cake and eat it too. But such pessimists should not entirely monopo-
lize the scene. People have world wars when they cannot afford 
them, but also--sometimes-they do not have world wars when 
they can, or should, logically, afford them. What is most logical, 
often never comes to pass. Perhaps we can limit the wars of the 
future to little wars, in which the big fry stay out, and help keep 
the general peace. Little wars, quite obviously, are better than 
big wars, especially if the United States of America keeps out of 
them. We could doubtless have bought up all of Europe, and its 
leaders, for a fraction of the vast war debt incurred by August, 
1945. Wars really do not pay, especially wars advertised to end 
wars. 
To some of the young and old hotspurs of 1947, all comprom-
ise is detestable. This is understandable, for we are living in a 
fanatical and barbarous age, not unlike that of the seventeenth 
century. But we must compromise, in order to live and do business. 
Too much internationalism means an end to our restricted im-
migration and high standards of living. We might then turn into 
a second Brazil. Too much internationalism also means too little 
self-government. All this is obvious. Yet, too much nationalism 
means an international slaughter house and an end to Western 
Civilization-what there is left of it. 
There is a middle way. It is sordid, dull, and uninspiring. It 
must be cynical to succeed. It must distrust "enthusiasm," as did 
our Founding Fathers, in the eighteenth century. It must plod 
along by trial and error, with a high regard for order, and a low 
regard for slogans. Lives are better than words ; food is better 
than oratory; self-government is equal to any one of the vaunted 
Four Freedoms. After what we have suffered since 1933, we have 
reason to be discouraged. Legal instruments may have some merit. 
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It is not a pretty world to live in. But while there is life, there is 
hope. Stephen Decatur's famous motto, which today is most un-
fashionable, is not to be despised. Mankind is exclusive, and not 
inclusive, by his very nature. He must put his faith in something. 
That is what the D.A.R. is dedicated to, and that is why I have 
spoken tonight .. 
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